A low Hamming weight product (LHWP) exponent is used to increase the efficiency of cryptosystems based on the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). In this paper, we introduce a new tool, called a Parameterized Splitting System, to analyze the security of the DLP with LHWP exponents. We apply a parameterized splitting system to attack the GPS identification scheme modified by Coron, Lefranc and Poupard in CHES'05 and obtain an algorithm of 2 61.6 time complexity which was expected to be 2 78 . Also a parameterized splitting system can be used to solve the DLP with a LHWP exponent proposed by Hoffstein and Silverman in 2 54.51 time complexity, that is smaller than 2 59 in the recent Cheon-Kim attack.
Introduction
It is important to compute exponentiations efficiently in cryptosystems based on the DLP. One approach to achieve this is to choose an exponent of low Hamming weight. For example, the GPS identification scheme proposed by Girault [4, 5, 7] uses as a secret key a product of two integers having low Hamming weight [4, 5, 7] . Hoffstein and Silverman suggested a use of exponent x = x 1 x 2 x 3 , where each integer x i has very low Hamming weight [9] . But a use of low Hamming weight exponents may weaken the security.
The Heiman-Odlyzko algorithm [8] and the Coppersmith's splitting system [3, 10, 16] have been used to analyze the DLP with low Hamming weight exponents. The complexity of solving the DLP with the Coppersmith's splitting system is about the square root of the size of the key space when the exponent is a single integer. It can be regarded to be almost optimal since the DLP has the square root complexity in the generic model [14] .
In [9] , Hoffstein and Silverman proposed an attack against low Hamming weight product (LHWP) exponents. In [4] , Coron, Lefranc and Poupard combined the above attack with the Coppersmith's splitting system and described an algorithm that can be applied when the order of a group is unknown. But the complexity of the attack is far from the square root of the size of the key space.
Our results: In this paper, we generalize the Coppersmith's splitting system into a parameterized splitting system and propose its construction. It can be used to show that given a bit string of length n, weight t and a positive integer t 1 < t, there exists a part of the string of length n 1 and weight t 1 where n1 t1 ≈ n t . We apply a parameterized splitting system to the private key of the GPS identification scheme [4, 7] and the Hoffstein and Silverman's exponent [9] (originally designated for 2 80 bit security). In [4] , Coron, Lefranc and Poupard proposed an attack with 2 52 complexity to recover the private key of the GPS identification scheme from CHES'04 and suggested a new private key which is claimed to have the security level of 2 78 . But our parameterized splitting system reduces them to 2 47.7 and 2 65.5 , respectively, and its randomized version reduces them to 2 43.5
and 2 61. 6 , respectively. In [1] , Cheon and Kim introduced the notion of rotationfree elements and proposed an attack of 2 55.9 complexity to the Hoffstein and Silverman's exponent. By combining the parameterized splitting system and the concept of rotation-freeness, we reduce it further to 2 54.51 .
Organization of the paper:
In Section 2, we briefly introduce the HeimanOdlyzko algorithm, the Coppersmith's splitting system and the rotation-free elements. In Section 3, we propose a parameterized splitting system and its application to the DLP of LHWP exponents.
In Section 4, we analyze the complexity of the GPS identification scheme and the DLP with the Hoffstein and Silverman's exponent. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
Preliminaries
Let g be a generator of a group G and x is an integer. From now on, ord g and wt(x) denote the order of g and the Hamming weight of x, respectively. Shanks' Baby-Step Giant-Step [13] and Pollard's Rho algorithm [11] are representative algorithms for the DLP. Algorithms for the DLP with low Hamming weight exponents are variants of Shanks' Baby-Step Giant-Step. In this section, we introduce the Heiman-Odlyzko algorithm, the Coppersmith's splitting system and the rotation-free elements. In this section, we assume ord g is known.
The Heiman-Odlyzko Algorithm
The Heiman-Odlyzko algorithm [8] was introduced by Heiman and Odlyzko independently. (In [8] , Heiman remarked this algorithm was independently noticed by Odlyzko.) In this section, we sketch the Heiman-Odlyzko algorithm.
We use the notations from [16] . We regard the binary representation of
as the vector x = (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ).
Then this set of vectors corresponds to
{i :
The following two mappings, which are inverse to each other, express the above correspondence.
Consider the following equation
From the above equation, we get 
The Coppersmith's Splitting System
The Coppersmith's splitting system was introduced in [10] , based on the idea from [2] . Later, Stinson gave a good description of it in [16] . We follow this description. Remark. An (n, t)-splitting system is denoted by an (N ; n, t)-splitting system if it has N blocks.
The existence of a splitting system follows from this construction: Suppose A Randomized Algorithm The randomized version of the above algorithm is summarized in [16] , which is also due to [3] . The time complexity of the randomized version is
) and the space complexity of the randomized
) .
Rotation-Free Elements
In The idea of Cheon and Kim's attack on LHWPs is to reduce the key search space by considering only one element from each equivalent class.
Since there is no known algorithm to generate such representatives efficiently, they suggested a use of the set of rotation-free elements which contains at least one representative for each equivalent class. The set is only little bit larger than the number of equivalent classes and easily generated.
The definition of rotation-free elements is as follows:
Let n, k be positive integers with k < n and RF (n, k) be the number of rotation-free elements of weight k in
Parameterized Splitting Systems
In this section, we construct a Parameterized Splitting System, that is a generalization of the Coppersmith's splitting system. In the Coppersmith's splitting system, given Y ⊂ Z n , the size of a block B such that |Y ∩ B| = t 2 is fixed to n 2 . We show that the size of a block B can be flexible so that |Y ∩ B| = t s and |B| = ⌊ tsn t ⌋ for any 0 ≤ t s ≤ t. This flexibility yields an efficient algorithm for the DLP with LHWP exponents.
We start with the definition of parameterized splitting systems.
Definition 3. (Parameterized Splitting Systems)
Suppose n and t are integers such that 0 < t < n. For any t s such that 0 ≤ t s ≤ t, a (N ; n, t, t s )-parameterized splitting system is a pair (X, B) that satisfies the following properties.
Remark. We may assume 0 < t <
The following Lemma 1 constructs an efficient parameterized splitting system.
Suppose there doesn't exist 
is a (n; n, t, t s )-parameterized splitting system.
A Randomized Version
For given Y and t s , Theorem 1 implies that if we try at most n blocks, we can find some block B such that |Y ∩ B| = t s . In a randomized version, we randomly choose B ⊂ Z n such that |B| = ⌊ tsn t ⌋ and check whether |Y ∩ B| = t s . Then the probability of success is
.
Lemma 3 shows that the expected number of trials to find a good block B such that |Y ∩ B|
We require Lemma 2 from [16] to get Lemma 3.
Lemma 2. Suppose that n and λn are positive integers, where
Proof.
,
We may assume 1
⊓ ⊔

The DLP with LHWP Exponents when the Order of g is Known
Before detailing how parameterized splitting systems can be used, we review some known methods.
For an integer x, we denote by |x| the bit-length of x. Let X 1 = {x 1 :
As in [4, 9] , from the following equation
x can be computed by repeating an algorithm for the DLP by |X 1 |. So, the time complexity and the space complexity of the Heiman-Odlyzko algorithm are
respectively. To minimize the time complexity, t s should be ⌈ 
and O
Another attack, which is also followed from [4, 9] , takes the trade-off between time and space. y = g x1x2 can be converted into
where
denotes the multiplicative inverse of x 1 modulo the order of g.
Put wt(x 3 ) = t s . From the above equation, we find x 1 and x 2 by computing both sides and comparing them.
Therefore the time complexity and the space complexity of the HeimanOdlyzko algorithm are
and O ( min
Comparing to the first application, the time complexity is lower.
The time complexity and the space complexity of the splitting system are
respectively. Comparing to the first application, the efficiency of the time complexity is hardly improved. In the case of the DLP with a single integer exponent of low Hamming weight, the splitting system appears to be more efficient than the HeimanOdlyzko algorithm since one of the factors of the time complexity, n 2 , is reduced to n2 2 in the splitting system. But the splitting system fixes t s = t2 2 while the Heiman-Odlyzko algorithm is able to choose t s arbitrary. This difference yields the Heiman-Odlyzko algorithm carries out trade-off efficiently while the splitting system does not. Now we propose a new algorithm using parameterized splitting systems, which takes the advantages from both of previous algorithms. From Section 3.1,
Then, we get the following equation
From the above equation, we get Algorithm 1. The first part of Algorithm 1 is to compute and store all the values of the left-hand side. The second part of Algorithm 1 is to compute each value of the right-hand side and check if it is in the list from the first part. Now we present Algorithm 1 and its randomized version.
Algorithm 1
Finding discrete logarithm when the order of g is known (deterministic)
Input: g, y ∈ G, X1, (n2; n2, t2, ts)-parameterized splitting system (Zn 2 , B) Output: log g y 1: for all x1 ∈ X1 do 2: for all Bi do 3:
for all Y1,i ⊂ Bi such that |Y1,i| = ts do 4:
Compute y
Sort for all x1 ∈ X1 do 4:
for all Y1 ⊂ B such that |Y1| = ts do 5:
Sort ) and find a collision. So, we store one of two sets which has smaller cardinality. Thus, the time complexity and the space complexity (neglecting logarithmic factors) are
and
respectively. Lemma 3 implies that in about
And we only make L for each B. Thus, if we count the number of group exponentiations, the time complexity and the space complexity are
respectively.
The DLP with LHWP Exponents when the Order of g is Unknown
Recall the following equation in Section 3.2,
If ord g is unknown, x
is not easy to compute from x 1 and so Equation (3) cannot be checked directly.
However, we can use Algorithm 1 or 2 from following trick from [4] and, earlier, proposed by Shoup [15] . Let
we get
To solving the DLP, we should perform the precomputation of y
and store them.
x i ∈ X 1 } can be computed by the algorithm proposed by Coron, Lefranc and Poupard in [4] . According to the algorithm, |X 1 | · log 2 |X 1 | group exponentiations are necessary.
Therefore if we are able to learnĝ −1 , we have Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 3
Finding discrete logarithm when the order of g is unknown (deterministic) 
Algorithm 4
Finding discrete logarithm when the order of g is unknown (randomized) 
Analysis: First, we analyze Algorithm 3. In Step 1, we perform |X 1 | · log 2 |X 1 | group exponentiations and store the results. There is no change of the time complexity and space complexity in Step 2. Therefore, the time complexity is
and the space complexity is
The best efficiency of the time complexity can be achieved when
The only difference with Algorithm 3 is Step 2. Therefore, the time complexity is
Remark. We note that Algorithm 3 and 4 might output false answers. These errors come from the fact that the order ofĝ of Equation (4) might be smaller than that of g. The worst case is that the order of g is a divisor of that ofĝ. In this case, Equation (4) is an identical equation.
Applications
In this section, we attack the private keys of the GPS identification scheme [5, 6, 12] and the exponent proposed by Hoffstein and Silverman [9] .
Attacks on Private Keys of the GPS Identification Scheme
We briefly introduce the GPS identification scheme.
GPS Identification Scheme
The GPS identification scheme, such as labelled by the NESSIE project, is an interactive protocol between a prover and a verifier which contains one or several rounds of three passes [7] . The GPS identification scheme is based on the DLP over Z N * . Precisely, when g is an element of Z N * of maximal order m, the GPS identification scheme is based on the DLP over G = ⟨g⟩, where ord g is secret. When y = g −x mod N , a private key of a prover is x and public keys are (N, g, y) . N is the product of two primes and the factorization of N should be difficult.
There are four security parameters as follows:
I. S is the binary size of x. Typically, S=160.
ii. k is the binary size of the challenges sent to the prover and determines the level of security of the scheme. iii. R is the binary size of the exponents used in the commitment computation.
It typically verifies R = S + k + 80. iv. m is the number of rounds the scheme is iterated. Theoretically, m is polynomial in the size of the security parameter. But, in practice, m is often chosen equal to 1.
Prover Verifier
Private Keys of the GPS Identification Scheme For the efficiency of the protocol, Girault and Lefranc proposed a private key x as x = x 1 x 2 in [7] , where x 1 is a 19-bit number with 5 random bits equal to 1 chosen among the 16 least significant ones, x 2 is a 142-bit number with 16 random bits equal to 1 chosen among the 138 least significant ones in CHES'04. Later in CHES'05, to strengthen the security, Coron, Lefranc and Poupard suggest the modified x 1 and x 2 in [4] , where x 1 is a 30-bit number with 12 nonzero bits and x 2 is a 130-bit number with 26 nonzero bits.
Attacks on Private Keys
, n 2 = 138, t 2 = 16 for private keys from [7] and
, n 2 = 130, t 2 = 26 for private keys from [4] . Since N is public we can easily computeĝ −1 of Algorithm 2, using the extended Euclidean algorithm. Before applying these private keys to Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4, we note that when t s is chosen to guarantee the most efficient time complexity, the cost of precomputation is negligible. Table 1 compares the complexities of recovering private keys from [7] and Table 2 for [4] . The private key from [7] was broken in [4] Table 2 shows that the parameterized splitting system and its randomized version reduce the complexity of the DLP with the private key proposed in [4] 
In [1] , Cheon and Kim modify k so that x ′′ 3 becomes rotation-free. Then the complexity for n = 1000 is n · RF (n, 2)
On the other hand, if we combine the existence of a parameterized splitting system and the notion of the rotation-free, we get a little bit smaller complexity. When we split x 3 , we apply the Theorem 1 to find a block B such that |B| = ⌊ 3n 11 ⌋ and |set(x 3 ) ∩ B| = 3. We write set( First, we enumerate the number of solutions satisfying the above conditions when l 7 ̸ = 0. Consider the following equation.
This is the problem that how many solutions of positive integers the linear Diophantine equation (5) 
) . ) .
